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Abstract: This study focused on five epistemic emotions, namely surprise, curiosity, confusion,
interest, and wonder. The aim was to investigate their change during task processing, their
interrelations as well as their relations with metacognitive experiences in problem solving.
Participants were 108 undergraduate students of psychology. They responded to three scenarios
of varying difficulty describing learning situations. Performance on the tasks was followed by
external feedback on the correctness of the response. Τhe feedback created conditions eliciting
epistemic emotions. The epistemic emotions were measured at three different times during
task processing. There were also two measures of metacognitive experiences. The results
showed that epistemic emotions differed in the three tasks, depending on the discrepancy
between the initial schema that guided performance and the feedback. Furthermore, their
intensity decreased as task processing progressed. There were also interrelations of epistemic
emotions between them, particularly between confusion and wonder, and between surprise
and all the other emotions. Finally, there were relationships between epistemic emotions and
metacognitive feelings.
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INTRODUCTION
Epistemic emotions constitute an important category of human emotions. They arise
when the object of attention is knowledge and the processes of knowing (Morton,
2010; Muis, Psaradellis, Lajoie, Leo, & Chevrier, 2015; Pekrun & Linnenbrick-Garcia,
2012; Pekrun & Stephens, 2012). Although studied by philosophers, they have been
neglected in psychological research (Brun, Doguoglu, & Kuenzle, 2008; Morton,
2010). From an evolutionary point of view, epistemic emotions serve the acquisition
of new knowledge by focusing attention onto one’s own knowledge states and/or their
relationships with the world (Brun et al., 2008; Elgin, 2008; Morton, 2010). In
learning, epistemic emotions are important because they can facilitate the directing
of attention to cognitive discrepancies or interruptions in cognitive processing and
the search for new information that can restore the flow of processing (Efklides, 2017;
Touroutoglou & Efklides, 2010). The aim of the present study was to investigate the
role of cognitive discrepancy on the triggering of epistemic emotions, their
development during task processing as new information changes the cognitive state
that gave rise to them, and their interrelations.
Surprise, curiosity and confusion are epistemic emotions par excellence because
their focus is always knowledge states. According to Graesser, Ozuru, and Sullins
(2010), they usually arise in complex learning tasks. Complex learning is often
associated with cognitive interruption (Kang et al., 2009; Mandler, 1975) that triggers
surprise if the interruption is unexpected (Muis, Psaradellis et al., 2015; Touroutoglou
& Efklides, 2010). It is also associated with awareness of uncertainty or lack of needed
information that give rise to curiosity (Efklides, 2017). It may also give rise to confusion
if the interruption is due to conflict (e.g., in response or pieces of information) that
cannot be resolved (Muis, Psaradellis et al., 2015).
On the other hand, there are emotions such as wonder that is manifested in
learning situations and are “caused by something new, unusual, strange, or
marvelous” (Lewis, Canby, & Brown, 1946). Wonder is epistemic in nature because
it denotes a desire to know and speculation about the nature of the object of wonder.
It may also denote doubt about, e.g., the meaning of an unusual or strange event,
possible ways to deal with it, amazement, or even astonishment. From this point of
view, wonder is related to surprise and curiosity (Lewis et al., 1946) but also to interest
(Izard, 1977). Presumably, it is also related to confusion when the source of wonder
cannot be resolved and there is conflicting information.
A broader conceptualization of epistemic emotions includes any emotion caused
by properties of cognitive processing (Pekrun & Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2012).
Specifically, achievement emotions can act as epistemic depending on their object
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(Muis, Psaradellis et al., 2015; Muis, Pekrun, Sinatra, Azevedo, Trevors, Meier, &
Heddy, 2015). For example, interest has been associated in the past with surprise and
curiosity (Izard & Ackerman, 2000; Stein & Levine, 1991). In such a case interest is
triggered by knowledge states that give rise to epistemic emotions, such as discrepancy
and/or interruption of processing. This assumption, however, has not been tested in
the past.
This study aimed to investigate, firstly, the effect of task-specific factors such as
discrepancy between one’s knowledge schemas and congruent (or discrepant)
feedback on the triggering and change of epistemic emotions as new information is
acquired. Secondly, to examine the interrelations between surprise, curiosity,
confusion, wonder, and interest. Thirdly, to delimit the possible relations between
epistemic emotions and metacognitive experiences, which also arise in response to
cognitive processing and knowledge states (Efklides, 2006, 2008; Touroutoglou &
Efklides, 2010).
In what follows, after the overview of research on epistemic emotions, we shall
present evidence associating them with metacognitive experiences. Then the study
will be presented and discussed.
Epistemic emotions
Surprise
Surprise is a short-lived emotional reaction, activated when the individual faces
unexpected events of all kinds (Izard, 1977; Kagan, 2002; Reisenzein, 2000). Surprise
serves important adaptive functions and for many researchers belongs to basic
emotions (Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1977; Meyer, Reisenzein, & Schützwohl, 1997).
According to the cognitive-evolutionary model of Meyer et al. (1997), the emotion
of surprise is a built-in information-processing tool that constantly compares, at an
unconscious level, the active cognitive schema with newly acquired information.
When detecting a discrepancy between existing cognitive schemas and new
information, surprise immediately triggers an interruption of processing that allows
the individual to analyze and evaluate the unexpected event and to update and
review existing relevant schemas (Topolinski & Strack, 2015). This serves short- but
also long-term adaptation and learning. Surprise helps the individual to revise their
beliefs, adapt to the environment, and be prepared to face similar situations in the
future. On the other hand, surprise is terminated if new information about the
discrepant event is provided or figured out. Presumably, this will impact the relations
of surprise with the other epistemic emotions that are associated with it such as
curiosity or confusion.
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Curiosity
Curiosity is considered basic emotion (Berlyne, 1960; Izard, 1977) and serves
adaptation to the environment by facilitating exploratory behavior that increases the
range of stimuli/information available to the person. According to Berlyne (1960),
there are two kinds of curiosity: perceptual and epistemic. Perceptual curiosity is
triggered by complex or ambiguous sensory stimuli (Collins, Litman, & Spielberger,
2004). Epistemic curiosity is the desire for new knowledge. It guides the person to
learn new things, fill in cognitive gaps and solve mental problems (Litman, 2008).
Epistemic curiosity is one of the most important emotions for cognitive development
(Sternberg, 1994), for personal development (Kashdan, Rose, & Fincham, 2004) and
for school and learning (Day, 1982).
Curiosity occurs when there is a gap between the information the individual
already has and the information one would like to have (Loewenstein, 1994). It is
triggered by interest and the desire to increase information on a topic/issue which is
a positive emotional state , or by the detection of gap in one’s knowledge that needs
to be filled in. In the latter case, curiosity is associated with negative affect, such as
uncertainty, due to lack of information (Litman, 2008; Litman & Jimerson, 2004).
This entails that when one has sufficient knowledge about a topic curiosity is not
triggered. Also, curiosity is not necessarily triggered if the person has no information
about something. Evidently, if the gap between one’s current knowledge and the
desired one is overcome because new information fills in the gap, curiosity is satisfied
and terminated. Finally, according to Muis, Psaradellis et al. (2015), when one
experiences surprise, the emotion of curiosity or the emotion of confusion follows.
Confusion
Confusion is triggered when the individual is confronted with ideas and events that
are inconsistent with existing cognitive patterns and one does not know how to
proceed (Stein & Levine, 1991). Specifically, confusion is likely to arise when there
is an enduring mismatch between incoming information and prior knowledge, which
cannot be resolved directly and automatically. Also, when new information cannot
be assimilated into existing schemas, or when the information flow is interrupted due
to inconsistencies in the information being processed. Situations involving
inconsistency, discrepancy, or conflict cause a stalemate in cognitive processing and
lead to a state of cognitive imbalance, which is associated with increased physiological
arousal and a need for more thinking (Muis, Psaradellis et al., 2015).
When the person feels confused, they begin to engage in problem-solving activities
to restore balance. The individual tries to resolve the problem by evaluating the source
of information, by adapting one’s strategies and following a solution path (Muis,
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Pekrun et al., 2015). These activities lead to deeper processing of information,
increased attention and more successful information retrieval (Craik & Tulving,
1975). In this way, confusion facilitates comprehension processes, as the individual
needs to establish new and deeper links between ideas or knowledge schemas and
engage in carefully guided cognitive activities. If comprehension is restored, confusion
is terminated.
However, it is important to note that confusion by itself does not necessarily lead
to learning benefits. Under certain conditions it may promote learning, but there are
occasions that lead to opposite results. For example, when a student is “confused”
while trying to solve a difficult problem and gives up after some unsuccessful attempts,
confusion is not expected to lead to learning gains. Likewise, confusion that remains,
without finding a solution, does not lead to learning (D ’Mello & Graesser, 2010;
D’Mello, Lehman, Pekrun, & Graesser, 2014).
Wonder
Wonder as an emotion has a double face: (a) doubt or speculation about something
novel or unexpected and (b) astonishment, admiration, marvel (Lewis et al., 1946).
The Greek word for wonder is “aporia”, which means lack of way out, difficulty to
figure out the meaning of something, embarrassment, or surprise accompanied by
doubt (Μανδαλά, 2007). Thus, the epistemic aspect of wonder is the one related to
the desire to know about a new, strange or unexpected, surprising, object or event
but this cannot be achieved because there is no obvious or direct way to deal with it.
The person feels overwhelmed by something that is incomprehensible or difficult to
understand (Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1977). This causes doubt, speculation, or even
curiosity (Lewis et al., 1946). Thus, wonder is related to both surprise and curiosity
but also to interest (Izard & Ackerman, 2000; Schmitt & Lahroodi, 2008).
The closest relationship, however, is between curiosity and wonder. The two
feelings are reactions to seemingly unexplainable events. Despite wonder sharing
features with curiosity, the two emotions also have differences. Specifically, curiosity
is accompanied by energetic effort and exploration of the environment, while wonder
is more passive and often leads to intellectual reasoning rather than action. Moreover,
whereas curiosity urges the person to analyze in depth the object of curiosity, in wonder
the person tries to find the fullest meaning of the unexpected event (Fuller, 2006).
The question is if wonder is also related to confusion. It is plausible that when
one wonders about the meaning of something unexpected they come across dead
ends or conflicting viewpoints. In such a case, wonder would be related to confusion.
However, there is no empirical evidence, to our knowledge, connecting wonder with
confusion.
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Interest
Interest is an emotion that allows the person to focus on and actively engage with an
object, event or process (Krapp, 2005; see also Izard, 1977; Sansone & Smith, 2000).
It is characterized by high stimulation and positive valence. Interest arises in
environments that are appraised by the individual as safe, but at the same time offer
challenges due to novel or unknown information, and/or complexity (Berlyne, 1960).
The condition, however, for the triggering of interest is that one feels they can
understand and cope with the challenges (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Interest can be a
relatively stable person characteristic, a trait, that is, an orientation towards a field
(e.g., mathematics). It can also be triggered by task or situational features; in the
latter case, it is called state or situational interest (Hidi & Renninger, 2006). State
interest can very soon decrease once the person realizes that the stimulus/event that
caused it has limited value for ensued processing. Presumably, if interest is triggered
by a discrepant event that gave rise to surprise, it will decrease when surprise is
terminated due to new incoming information. However, if the new information
requires further processing to fit in with prior knowledge, then interest may remain
active because there is still challenge, albeit manageable.
Interest is considered source of intrinsic motivation, necessary for the development
of knowledge and experience (Kashdan, 2004). It motivates the individual to explore
new environments (as curiosity does), focus on new opportunities, and acquire
experiences without any obvious reward (Fredrickson, 1998; Izard & Ackerman, 2000).
Therefore, interest can be related to both surprise and curiosity. The question is if it
is also related to wonder and confusion.
To sum up, the research overview shows that epistemic emotions are short-lived
and serve important adaptation functions. Because they are triggered by cognitive
states that share features such as discrepancy, interruption or conflict it is plausible
to assume that there are interrelations between them, particularly between surprise
and curiosity, on the one hand, and surprise and confusion on the other.
Epistemic emotions and metacognition
Epistemic emotions are associated with learning processes (D’Mello & Graesser,
2012), motivation (Kang et al., 2009), learning strategies (Muis, Pekrun et al., 2015),
and learning outcomes (D’Mello et al., 2014). Specifically, activation of positive
academic emotions, such as enjoyment and curiosity, are related to adoption of
appropriate learning strategies (Pekrun & Stephens, 2012). Confusion, if resolved,
positively predicts the use of learning strategies (Muis, Psaradellis et al., 2015).
However, cognitive states such as interruption of processing or discrepancies
Epistemic emotions 183
between incoming information and activated schemas give rise to both epistemic
emotions, namely surprise, and metacognitive feelings tapping lack of fluency such as
feeling of difficulty (Touroutoglou & Efklides, 2010). Also, epistemic curiosity is an
emotion that occurs in situations in which there is gap in one’s knowledge, and hence
uncertainty (low confidence) (Efklides, 2017) or desire for more information. Curiosity
presupposes that there is potential that the missing information can be retrieved or
recovered after exploration. Loewenstein (1994) associated curiosity with metacognitive
experiences such as the tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) state and feeling of knowing. That is,
one needs to be aware that the missing information can be accessed if one is to actively
search for it, as in TOT. In situations in which there is no prior knowledge curiosity is
not triggered because one does not know what to search for. It can be hypothesized then
that epistemic curiosity will be negatively related to feelings of confidence and knowing.
In the case of confusion and wonder there is no prior research connecting them
to metacognitive experiences. However, both wonder and confusion are associated
with impasses in the meaning-making process. Specifically, wonder occurs when one
tries to figure out why something unexpected happened and there is no immediately
available explanation. This means that the person feel that they cannot make sense
of the situation. From this point of view, wonder should be negatively related to
feeling of confidence that one knows the answer and to feeling that one makes sense
of the situation (i.e., comprehension of the available information). Confusion, on the
other hand, is associated with discrepant, inconsistent or conflicting information that
prevents fluent cognitive processing. Therefore, it should be negatively related to
feeling of confidence and feeling of comprehension.
In so far as the relationship of interest with the metacognitive experiences is
concerned, there should be no relationship between them to the extent interest is not
epistemic in nature and serves engagement with a task.
To sum up, there is evidence suggesting relations between epistemic emotions
and metacognitive experiences such as feeling of confidence or feeling of
comprehension. Interest is not expected to be related to metacognitive experiences.
The present study: Aims and design
A within subject design was followed. The present study used three scenarios
regarding memory and learning. The independent variable was the level of difficulty
of the scenarios, in terms of compatibility of the schema that guided response and
feedback on the accuracy of response. The dependent variables were performance,
epistemic emotions (three measurements), and metacognitive feelings (feeling of
confidence and feeling of comprehension).
184 K. Nerantzaki & A.Efklides
Scenarios differed in difficulty. Specifically, the easy scenario was about a highly
predictable learning situation; the difficult scenario was about a phenomenon that
runs contrary to lay beliefs about learning, and the moderate difficulty scenario was
about a relatively less well-known learning phenomenon (see McCabe, 2011). The
presentation order of the scenarios was randomized. After participants had
answered to the question regarding the scenario (performance measure) and
judgment of confidence about the correctness of the answer, corrective feedback
was provided. This was the trigger of epistemic emotions. Then, the first
measurement of epistemic emotions took place. At the next step, explanation of
the psychological principle underlying the feedback was provided. A judgment of
comprehension of the explanation of the principle followed, and after it the second
measurement of the epistemic emotions took place. Questions about possible
strategies one would use when coming across a similar learning situation were then
presented to probe the understanding of the implications of the psychological
principle explained. Immediately afterwards the third measurement of epistemic
emotions took place.
Hypotheses
1. Performance in the scenarios will be negatively related to the epistemic
emotions, except for interest, since surprise, curiosity, wonder and confusion are
likely to arise when the person faces unexpected, discrepant, or conflicting
information to the schema that guided performance (Hypothesis 1).
2. Epistemic emotions will vary as a function of scenario difficulty (Hypothesis 2a).
The more difficult the scenario, and hence lower the performance, the higher the
level of epistemic emotions. Moreover, the intensity of the epistemic emotions
will decrease after explanation of the principles underlying the phenomenon
depicted in the scenarios (second and third measurement time) (Hypothesis 2b).
3. The epistemic emotions will be interrelated. Surprise will be related to curiosity,
confusion and wonder, and curiosity to wonder. Surprise and curiosity are also
expected to be related to interest (Hypothesis 3).
4. Feeling of confidence and feeling of comprehension will be negatively associated
to epistemic emotions (Hypothesis 4), since the epistemic emotions occur when




The sample consisted of 108 undergraduate students of the School of Psychology of
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. Ninety-six of them (88.9%) were women. Their
average age was 19 years. All of them attended the first semester in their studies and
had limited theoretical knowledge on memory and learning.
Since two of the scenarios referred to the use of pictures or videos during their
study, participants were asked how many hours they usually spent working on PC or
used a cell phone. All participants used computer at least one hour per day. Ninety-
seven percent of the sample had a picture and camera cell phone.
Materials
Scenarios
There were three scenarios (Exams, Diagram, Brain), which were created for this
study. The scenarios were based on McCabe’s (2011) research on learning and study
strategies. Each scenario described two psychology students, who studied for the same
course, had the same learning material, but used different learning strategies.
Specifically, the Exams scenario presented two students who studied to pass an exam.
The first student mass studied the course material whereas the second student
followed spaced study. In the Diagram scenario, two psychology students studied the
course material. The first student studied a science video in which there was a diagram
and a speaker explaining verbally the diagram, while the second student studied the
same video with the same diagram, but the information was presented in text form
next to the diagram. Finally, in the Brain scenario, two psychology students studied
the structures and functions of the human brain. The first student studied a
multimedia video showing, through movement and color change, how blood circulates
in the brain during information processing; the second student used the same
material, but in the form of black and white photographs. In all scenarios participants
were asked which student will perform better in the exams: Student A, Student B, or
Both Students. Only one response was correct (Student A or Student B).
The scenarios were constructed so they differed in their difficulty. The “Exams”
scenario was expected to be the easiest, as it was in line with the participants’ study
experiences, that is, spaced studying as contrasted to massed (at least when there is
plenty of time before exams, Rohrer & Pashler, 2007). The “Brain” scenario was
expected to be the most difficult, as the multimedia learning theory, that underlies this
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scenario, is in complete contrast to the naïve beliefs about multimedia effects on
learning. The Diagram scenario was expected to be of moderate difficulty.
To test the assumption about the scenario difficulty, a post hoc comparison of
performance scores was carried out. A within-subject ANOVA was applied. Since the
condition of sphericity was not met, Mauchly’s W = .607, χ²(2) = 52.860, the
Greenhouse-Greisser correction was used. There was a statistically significant
difference in performance between the three scenarios, F(1.436, 153.662) = 193.922,
p < .001, ηp² = .644. The Bonferroni paired comparison test showed that performance
in the Exams scenario (M = .926) was significantly higher (p < .001) than performance
in the Diagram scenario (M = .537) and significantly higher (p < .001) than in the
Brain scenario (M = .028). Also, scores in the Diagram scenario were significantly
higher (p < .001) than the Brain scenario.
Metacognitive feelings
Feeling of confidence. Right after the answer to the scenario, participants were
asked to state how confident they were that the response they had given was correct.
Responses were on a 4-point Likert- type scale, ranging from 1 = not at all confident
to 4 = very confident.
Feeling of comprehension. After the presentation of the scientific explanation of
the correct response, participants were asked to respond how well they understood the
explanation provided. The question was: “How well did you understand why A / B
(student) will do better than A / B?” Responses were on a 4-point Likert- type scale
ranging from 1 = not at all to 4 = very well.
Strategies
After the explanation of the principle underlying the feedback, and in order to probe
participants’ understanding of the principle, they were asked to respond the extent to
which they use each of seven strategies that were relevant to the content of each
scenario when they study. Responses were on a 4-point Likert-type scale, ranging
from 1 = never to 4 = always. In the Exams scenario, the strategies were about the
spaced or mass studying; for example, “I divide the material into sections and study
one section at a time”. In the Diagram scenario, the strategies referred to the
processing of tasks with diagrams (i.e., use of dual vs. single mode processing); for
example, “I see the diagram, then I read the corresponding part of the text, and then
return to the diagram”. Finally, in the Brain scenario, the strategies were about the
static or animated mode of presentation; for example, “I prefer to examine each
picture separately for as long as it needs and not use videos”.
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Epistemic emotions
The epistemic emotions, namely, surprise, wonder, confusion, curiosity, and interest,
were measured at three different time points: (a) after the feedback about the correct
answer, (b) after the explanation of the correct answer, and (c) after the questions on
the strategies participants would use to study in the situation depicted in the scenario.
Responses were on a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 4 = very
much. Participants were asked to respond to the following prompt: “What emotions
do you experience now that you were given the correct answer and to what degree?”
In the second measurement, the question was: “Now that you have read the
explanation, what emotions do you have at this moment and to what degree?” In the
third measurement, after the questions on strategies, the question was: “What
emotion do you have now and to what degree?” The order of presentation of the
emotions was as follows: surprise, wonder, confusion, curiosity, interest.
Procedure
Testing took place in groups of about 25 individuals. Participation was voluntary.
Participants could stop working on the tasks any moment they felt doing so. They
were also assured that anonymity was preserved. The order of presentation of the
scenarios was counterbalanced.
RESULTS
The mean scores and standard deviations of the epistemic emotions in the three
measurement points are presented in Table 1.
Relations between performance and epistemic emotions
To test Hypothesis 1, according to which performance on the scenarios would be
negatively related to the epistemic emotions of surprise, wonder, confusion and
curiosity, and positively to interest Pearson’s correlations in each scenario in each of
the three measurements were performed. The alpha level was set to .05 / 6 = .008.
In the Exams scenario, performance was significantly and negatively correlated
only with epistemic emotions of the first measurement: surprise, r = -.36, p < .001,
wonder, r = -.269, p = .005, confusion, r = -.427, p < .001, and curiosity, r = -.267,
p = .005. The correlation with interest was nonsignificant. In the second and third
measurements, there were no statistically significant correlations, presumably due to
the low stimulation of epistemic emotions in the easy scenario.
188 K. Nerantzaki & A.Efklides
In the Diagram scenario, performance was negatively associated with all epistemic
emotions. Specifically, performance was significantly and negatively correlated with
all the epistemic emotions of the first measurement: surprise, r = -.596, p < .001,
wonder, r = -.688, p < .001, confusion, r = -.645, p < .001, curiosity, r = -.526, p <
.001, and interest, r = -.350, p < .001. It also correlated significantly and negatively
with the epistemic emotions of the second measurement point: surprise, r = -.312, p
= .001, wonder, r = -.356, p < .001, confusion, r = -.412, p < .001, and curiosity, r =
-.333, p < .001. Negative correlations were maintained in the third measurement but
only for wonder, r = -288, p = .003, and confusion, r = -385, p < .001.
In the Brain scenario, performance was significantly and negatively correlated
only with two of the epistemic emotions of the first measurement point: surprise, r =
-.278, p = .004, and wonder, r = -.396, p < .001. There were no correlations with the
epistemic emotions of the second and third measurement points. This suggests that
the changes in epistemic emotions after the explanation of the answer and at the end
of task processing were not in line with the initial performance.
Overall, epistemic emotions were significantly and negatively associated to
performance mainly in the first measurement time when responses about epistemic
emotions were aligned to the schema that guided performance. The associations in
the easy and difficult scenarios in the second and third measurement points were not
significant because of the limited variability of the performance scores and the fact
that changes in the epistemic emotions scores occurred independently of the initial
performance schema, that is, reflected the impact of the feedback provided. In the
Table 1. Means and standard deviations for epistemic emotions in the three scenarios
Scenario Exams Diagram Brain
M SD M SD M SD
Surprisea 1.19 .54 1.87 .99 3.25 .76
Surpriseb 1.34 .67 1.87 .87 2.79 .89
Surprisec 1.27 .66 1.41 .68 2.00 .97
Wondera 1.20 .58 2.01 1.05 3.24 .82
Wonderb 1.14 .46 1.52 1.16 1.92 .89
Wonderc 1.12 .43 1.33 .67 1.47 .69
Confusiona 1.11 .43 1.76 .98 2.68 .94
Confusionb 1.07 .46 1.40 .68 1.61 .78
Confusionc 1.11 .39 1.29 .56 1.36 .62
Curiositya 1.52 .78 2.36 1.03 3.16 .98
Curiosityb 1.49 .75 1.81 .86 2.27 .99
Curiosityc 1.46 1.14 1.75 .86 1.92 .93
Interesta 2.52 .92 2.94 .84 3.29 .79
Interestb 2.50 .93 2.81 .93 3.14 .83
Interestc 2.37 .98 2.57 .93 2.92 .84
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moderately difficult scenario, the associations between performance and epistemic
emotions were maintained likely because the feedback provided was partly in line
with the initial schema that guided performance.
Task difficulty and measurement time effect
According to Hypothesis 2a, the intensity of epistemic emotions would increase as a
function of scenario difficulty. Moreover, the intensity of epistemic emotions would
change from the first to the following measurement times (Hypothesis 2b). To test
Hypothesis 2a, a 3(Task) by 3(Measurement time) within subject ANOVAs was
carried out for each epistemic emotion. The statistical indices are given in Table 2.
In all cases epistemic emotions were higher in the difficult scenario compared to
the easy and the moderate difficulty scenarios as the Bonferroni paired comparisons
showed (p < .001). Moreover, the measurement time effect suggests that the intensity
of the epistemic emotions was higher in the first compared to the second and third
measurement time. The interaction effect indicates that the changes in the easy
scenario were not as pronounced as in the other two scenarios, particularly the
difficult one.
Interrelations between epistemic emotions
To test Hypothesis 3 Pearson’s correlation was applied to the responses on epistemic
emotions in each scenario in the three measurement points. The α level was set to:
.05 / 15 = .003 (See Table 3a, 3b, and 3c for each scenario, respectively.)
Table 2. Task difficulty effect and measurement time effect on epistemic emotions
Main effect of task Main effect of Interaction of task difficulty
difficulty measurement time with measurement time
Surprise Pillai’s = .809, F(2, 106) = Pillai’s = .571, F(2, 106) = Pillai’s = .606, F(4, 104) =
224.637, p < .001, ηp
2 = .809 71.701, p < .001, ηp
2 = .571 39.924, p < .001, ηp
2 = .606
Wonder Pillai’s = .722, F(2, 106) = Pillai’s = .673, F(2, 106) = Pillai’s = .731, F(4, 104) =
137.844, p < .001, ηp
2 = .722 109.076, p < .001, ηp
2 = .673 70.750, p < .001, ηp
2 = .731
Confusion Pillai’s = .603, F(2, 106) = Pillai’s = .608, F(2, 106) = Pillai’s = .627, F(4, 104) =
80.489, p < .001, ηp
2 = .603 82.370, p < .001, ηp
2 = .608 43.727, p < .001, ηp
2 = .627
Curiosity Pillai’s = .578, F(2, 106) = Pillai’s = .426, F(2, 106) = Pillai’s = .428, F(4, 104) =
72.733, p < .001, ηp
2 = .578 39.256, p < .001, ηp
2 = .426 19.440, p < .001, ηp
2 = .428
Interest Pillai’s = .408, F(2, 106) = Pillai’s = .207, F(2, 106) = nonsignificant
36.513, p < .001, ηp
2 = .408 13.808, p < .001, ηp
2= .408
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Exams. As shown in Table 3a the correlations between epistemic emotions ranged
from r = .282, p < .001 to r = .849, p < .001. The epistemic emotions of the first
measurement significantly correlated between them, except for interest. The highest
rs were between surprise and confusion, r = .720, p < .001, and between wonder and
confusion, r = .706, p < .001. This pattern of correlations was retained in the second
measurement time for surprise, wonder and confusion, with the highest r between
wonder and confusion, r = .849, p < .001; at the third measurement, there were
correlations between surprise, wonder and confusion, with the highest r being between
wonder and confusion, r = .698, p < .001.
The epistemic emotions of the first measurement also correlated with the
respective emotions of the second measurement with highest rs for wonder, r = .772,
p < .001, and confusion, r = .869, p < .001. The epistemic emotions of the first
measurement were also associated, to a lesser extent, with the epistemic emotions of
the third measurement; the highest rs were between confusion of the first
measurement and wonder, r = .543, p < .001, and confusion, r = .537, p < .001, of
the third measurement. Finally, the epistemic emotions of the second measurement
were highly correlated with the respective emotions of the third measurement.
Interest was the only emotion that was not related to other epistemic emotions.
In conclusion, the intercorrelations between epistemic emotions in the easy
scenario were maintained at the three measurement points, probably because the
easiness of the task did not lead to overturning of the epistemic emotions when
feedback and explanation of the correct answer were provided.
Table 3a. Pearson correlations between epistemic emotions in the Exams scenario
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1.Surprisea -
2.Wondera .505** -
3.Confusiona .720** .706** -
4.Curiositya .293** .574** .398** -
5.Interesta .325** -
6. Surpriseb .603** .480** .370** -
7. Wonderb .679** .699* .772** .369** .579** -
8.Confusionb .611** .613** .869** .334** .412** .849** -
9. Curiosityb .384** .456** .333** .437** .618** .499** .387** -
10. Interestc .517** -
11. Surprisec .481** .369** .328** .664** .546** .392** .499** -
12. Wonderc .509** .584** .543** .317** .518** .720** .684** .483** .545** -
13.Confusionc .382** .557** .537** .388** .428** .631** .743** .380** .456** .698**
14.Curiosityc .282** .338** .285** .451** .365**
15. Interestc .498** .667**
Note: ** p <. 003. The symbols a, b, c, stand for first, second, and third measurement, respectively.
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Diagram. As shown in Table 3b, the correlations between epistemic emotions
ranged from r = .289, p < .001 to r = .810, p < .001. The epistemic emotions of the
first measurement were all intercorrelated, with the greatest correlations occurring
between surprise and wonder, r = .690, p < .001, and surprise with confusion, r =
.641, p < .001. Wonder also correlated highly with confusion, r = .810, p < .001. The
intercorrelations were not maintained in the second measurement, except for surprise
that was associated with all other epistemic emotions. The number of intercorrelations
between epistemic emotions increased in the third measurement. However, rs were
lower than in the first measurement.
Moreover, the epistemic emotions of the first measurement were associated with
almost all the epistemic emotions of the second and third measurement. This was
particularly true for wonder and confusion of the first measurement, which correlated
with almost all epistemic emotions of the other two measurements. Furthermore, the
epistemic emotions of the second measurement correlated with the epistemic
emotions of the third measurement.
Summing up, there were close interrelations between epistemic emotions in the
first measurement. There were fewer interrelations in the second measurement, but
their strength increased again in the third measurement.
Brain scenario. As shown in Table 3c, the correlations between epistemic
emotions ranged from r = .283, p < .001 to r = .701, p < .001. In the first
measurement, surprise was associated with wonder, r = .681, p < .001, and confusion,
Table 3b. Pearson correlations between epistemic emotions in the Diagram scenario
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1.Surprisea -
2.Wondera .690**-
3.Confusiona .641** .810** -
4.Curiositya .415** .588** 530** -
5.Interesta .430** .521** 413** .532** -
6. Surpriseb .615** .456** .380** .305** .375** -
7. Wonderb .338** .414** .398** .289** .357** -
8.Confusionb .327** .440** .436** .436** -
9. Curiosityb .462** .587** .310** 409** .364** .511** -
10. Interestc .561** 412** -
11. Surprisec .467** .327** .611** .322** -
12. Wonderc .409** .420** .381** .378** .627** .451** .394** -
13.Confusionc .407** .512** .303** .345** .549** .518** .396** .634** -
14.Curiosityc .348** .339** .434** .385** .460** .703** .351** .690** 537** -
15.Interestc .448** .349** .358** .612** 364** .320** .289** .476**
Note: ** p ≤. 003. The symbols a, b, c, stand for first, second, and third measurement, respectively.
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r = .609, p < .001. The number of interrelations dropped in the second measurement,
but increased again in the third measurement, when all epistemic emotions were
associated, at low level, with surprise and wonder.
The epistemic emotions of the first measurement were less closely associated to
the epistemic emotions of the second measurement, and even less to the epistemic
emotions of the third measurement, suggesting that the epistemic emotions were
highly impacted by the feedback and explanation of the principle underlying the
phenomenon described. Exception was the emotion of confusion of the first
measurement that was related to almost all the epistemic emotions of the second
measurement. On the contrary, the epistemic emotions of the second measurement
displayed a dense network of relationships with the epistemic emotions of the third
measurement, which reflects the change of emotions after the explanation.
In conclusion, despite the variability of interrelations between epistemic emotions
in the three scenarios there were some notable consistencies. Specifically, (a) each
epistemic emotion correlated with its counterpart in the three measurements; (b)
surprise correlated with all the epistemic emotions, but the strongest relations were
with wonder and confusion; less strong were the relations of surprise with curiosity
and interest; c) wonder was highly associated with confusion and moderately with
curiosity; d) confusion was associated moderately to low with curiosity, and e)
curiosity was occasionally associated with interest.
Table 3c. Pearson correlations between epistemic emotions in the Brain scenario
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1.Surprisea -
2.Wondera .681** .609**
3.Confusiona .502** .559** -
4.Curiositya .460** .356** .409** -
5.Interesta .300** .445** .464** -
6. Surpriseb .522** .311** 396** .287** -
7. Wonderb .307** .446** .476** -
8.Confusionb .383** .571** -
9. Curiosityb .303** .361** .416** .546** .509** -
10. Interestc .283** .442** -
11. Surprisec .330** .297** .523** 392** .296** .370** .281** -
12. Wonderc .334** .508** .568** .496** .434** -
13.Confusionc .282** .312** .532** .543** .389** .375** .648** -
14.Curiosityc .609** .364** .432** .516** .559** .562** .483** -
15.Interestc .389** .351** .306** .701** .458** . .324**
Note: ** p ≤. 003. The symbols a, b, c, stand for first, second, and third measurement, respectively.
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Relations between metacognitive experiences and epistemic emotions
To test Hypothesis 4, which regarded the relations of metacognitive feelings
confidence and comprehension with epistemic emotions, Pearson’s correlations
were computed in the three measurement times separately for each scenario. Because
of the large number of variables, the Bonferroni correction was applied, and the alpha
level was set at .05 / 6 = .008.
Feeling of confidence
There were no significant correlations between feeling of confidence and epistemic
emotions in the Exams and the Diagram scenarios. In the Brain scenario, confidence
was significantly and positively related with the epistemic emotions of the first
measurement time, that is, right after feedback: surprise, r = .396, p < .001, wonder, r
= .406, p < .001, and confusion, r = .290, p = .002. No correlations were found with the
epistemic emotions of the second and third measurements. This attests to the claim made
previously that the greater the confidence the greater the conflict with the discrepant
feedback provided. Hence, the relationship was positive rather than negative as one
would expect in the case of feedback that was congruent with the initial response.
Feeling of comprehension
In the easy scenario (Exams), no statistically significant relationship was found. In
the moderately difficult scenario (Diagram), feeling of comprehension was negatively
related to wonder of the first measurement, r = -.327, p = .001, and marginally to
curiosity, r = -249, p = .009. In the second measurement, feeling of comprehension
was negatively related to confusion, r = -.409, p = .001, and in the third measurement
to wonder, r = -.356, p = .001. This means that the better the participants
comprehended the explanation provided the lower the confusion and wonder, as one
would expect.
In the Brain scenario, feeling of comprehension was significantly and negatively
correlated with wonder, r = -.273, p = .004, and confusion, r = -.308, p = .001 of the first
measurement and the same emotions of the second measurement: wonder, r = -.301, p
= .002, and confusion, r = -.356, p < .001. That is, the better the participants understood
the feedback and explanation the lower the wonder and confusion they reported.
To sum up, the feedback and explanation created conflict in the participants who
had answered incorrectly but were highly confident in their response. This increased
wonder and confusion. On the contrary, the better the participants understood the
explanation of the scientific principle underlying the phenomenon depicted in the
scenario, the lower the wonder and confusion.
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DISCUSSION
This study aimed to investigate the relationships of five epistemic emotions (surprise,
wonder, confusion, curiosity, interest) between them and with metacognitive
experiences in cognitive problem solving.
Performance and epistemic emotions
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the relationship of performance with epistemic emotions
would be negative. This was confirmed in the easy and moderate difficulty scenario,
but not in the difficult one, in which almost all participants had responded incorrectly.
These findings suggest, firstly, that the epistemic emotions were triggered by the
feedback rather than performance per se. In the easy scenario the feedback was
consistent with the prevalent cognitive schema and, for his reason the intensity of
epistemic emotions was low. Obviously, in the few cases in which the prior schema was
not so strong (e.g., response “Both students”), there was some triggering of epistemic
emotions caused by the feedback. This suggests that assimilation of the new
information to the extant schema was taking place. In the moderately difficult task,
the discrepant feedback to the prior schema required revision of the schema. The
epistemic emotions reflected such a revision processes.
Secondly, in the difficult scenario, where there was also discrepancy of the
feedback from the extant cognitive schema, there was no relationship of performance
with epistemic emotions, contrary to what had happened with the easy and moderately
difficult scenarios. This suggests that epistemic emotions presuppose availability of
alternative cognitive schemas against which the information provided by the feedback
is judged. If there are no such alternative schemas (i.e., correct vs. incorrect or
partially correct schemas), then no assimilation or revision processes can be
implemented. The person needs to build a new schema dictated by the feedback and
its explanation. Hence, the epistemic emotions were controlled not by prior cognitive
schemas but by the explanation provided to justify the feedback. In this case, a new
schema was established, and the epistemic emotions reflected the processes involved
in the construction of the new schema.
Interrelations between epistemic emotions
Hypothesis 3 regarded the interrelations between epistemic emotions. The hypothesis
was partly confirmed. Firstly, there were interrelations between surprise, wonder,
confusion and curiosity. There were also relations between wonder and confusion,
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and in a few cases between curiosity and interest, particularly in the moderately
difficult scenario. Interest was hardly related to any of the epistemic emotions.
Secondly, there were relations between epistemic emotions in each measurement
time and across measurements. In the difficult scenario, the relations of the epistemic
emotions of the first measurement with those of the second and third measurement
were limited. This reflects the effect of the explanation of the correct response and
probably the difficulty to assimilate the new information into prior schemas. What is
worth noting is that in the difficult scenario surprise and wonder were associated with
curiosity and interest. Confusion was also associated with curiosity but not with
interest. The relationship of wonder and confusion with curiosity was not expected.
It may reflect deprivation-type curiosity rather than interest-type as in the moderately
difficult scenario.
Thirdly, despite the differences in the interrelations between epistemic emotions
in the three scenarios, what was consistent was that the highest correlations were
between wonder and confusion, which confirms the assumption that wonder is
conceptually closer to confusion than to curiosity and interest. However, wonder
cannot be equated with confusion because it has different pattern of relations with the
other epistemic emotions than confusion does.
Relations between metacognitive feelings and epistemic emotions
Another significant finding of this study was the limited number of correlations of
metacognitive feelings with the epistemic emotions, contrary to Hypothesis 4. This
suggests that, despite metacognitive feelings and epistemic emotions focusing on
cognitive processing, they are differentiated between them. A noteworthy finding was
that confidence in the difficult scenario was positively associated to surprise, wonder
and confusion of the first measurement rather than negatively. This suggests that the
more confident one is in an incorrect response the greater the surprise, wonder and
confusion when negative feedback is provided. Furthermore, feeling of confidence
was not related to curiosity, as Lowenstein (1994; see also Efklides, 2017) had
proposed. Further research is needed to clarify the conditions under which feeling of
confidence is associated with curiosity.
On the other hand, feeling of comprehension was negatively related to epistemic
emotions in the moderately difficult and difficult scenarios suggesting that the better
one understood the explanation of the feedback the lower the surprise, wonder or
confusion. There was also a marginal relationship of feeling of comprehension with
curiosity in the moderately difficult scenario. This finding requires further
investigation to establish the possible relation between feeling of comprehension and
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curiosity. It seems that feeling of comprehension can play the role of confidence as a
reflection of what one knows and gaps in one’s knowledge.
Contribution and Limitations of the study – Implications for future research
This study was a first approximation to understanding the functioning of epistemic
emotions in learning. It provided evidence supporting the role of cognitive states such
as discrepancy between one’s prior knowledge schemas and feedback in the triggering
of epistemic emotions. Furthermore, it showed that epistemic emotions change during
cognitive processing as more information is gained that allows the resolution of
cognitive impasses. However, more sophisticated design is needed to differentiate
the impact of cognitive states such as interruption of processing from discrepancy or
conflict on the specific epistemic emotions.
Another contribution of this study was the exploration of the relationships
between metacognitive feelings and epistemic emotions. The evidence is encouraging
but other feelings such as feeling of difficulty and awareness of effort exertion might
be implicated in the formation of epistemic emotions. The possible mediating and/or
moderating role of metacognitive experiences in the development of epistemic
emotions during cognitive processing needs also to be investigated.
Finally, this is the first empirical study to our knowledge that introduced wonder
as an epistemic emotion. The relations with surprise and confusion are high, and this
requires further research to examine the conditions that give rise to wonder rather
than confusion. Moreover, the relations of wonder with curiosity and interest need
further investigation, because it might be that wonder leads to curiosity and
exploratory behavior without the presence of confusion. However, considering the
close relationship of wonder with confusion it is important to clarify the
conceptualization of the two emotions before any firm conclusions can be drawn. The
transformation of wonder to a positive emotion such as admiration is another
challenge for future research (see Izard & Ackerman, 2000).
Finally, experimental evidence as the one provided in this study might offer
insights for interventions that can take advantage of epistemic emotions to enhance
learning (Muis, Psaradellis et al., 2015).
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